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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a hierarchical control based DC microgrid (DCmG) equipped with unknown input observer (UIO)
based detectors, and investigate false data injection (FDI) attacks against the secondary control layer. First, we point out
that the fundamental limitation of the UIO-based detector comes from the unknown inputs, whose dynamics can be utilized
to construct zero trace undetectable (ZTU) attacks causing zero impact on detection residuals. Furthermore, we extend ZTU
attacks to nonzero trace undetectable (NTU) attacks by utilizing the system noise, under which the detection residuals are
still bounded by certain detection thresholds. Then, by approximating primary control loops as unit gains, we theoretically
analyze attack impacts of NTU attacks on voltage balancing and current sharing in the DCmG. Moreover, we propose a
countermeasure against ZTU and NTU attacks by observing the average PCC voltage deviation. Finally, extensive simulations
are conducted in Simulink/PLECS to validate theoretical results and effectiveness of the countermeasure.
Key words: DC Microgrid; UIO-based detector; ZTU attack; NTU attack; Countermeasure.
1 Introduction
During the past decade, the microgrid, which is com-
posed of DGUs, storage devices, and flexible loads, has
become the most promising solution to integrate dis-
tributed generation units (DGUs) such as photovoltaic
(PV) arrays and wind turbines into the distribution grid
[2]. Recently, tremendous growth in DC loads such as
laptop computers, LED lights, and telecommunication
centers indicates that the DC microgrid (DCmG) can
be an economic and feasible solution in addressing the
future energy needs.
Generally, a hierarchical control framework is adopted
in the DCmG. In the primary control layer, the basic
control problem is to track local reference voltage [3]. In
the secondary control layer, each DGU’s reference volt-
age is regulated through a centralized/distributed com-
munication network to achieve current sharing and volt-
age balancing [4, 5]. However, communication networks
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will also expose new vulnerability surfaces to malicious
attackers, which may cause economic losses and even
crash the DCmG. Meanwhile, novel characteristics of
the low inertial DGU [6], the hierarchical control frame-
work [4], and the flexible network topology [7] in the
DCmG has made the cyber security issue unique, which
has attracted considerable attention.
Considering cyber attacks injecting invalid commands
or erroneous measurements into communication links,
Liu et al. proposed a resilient decentralized secondary
frequency control method for microgrids [8]. And Lu et
al. designed a distributed strategy to detect malicious
constant signals, by checking the dual-ascent update
iterations in micorgrids [9]. Moreover, Beg et al. pro-
posed a framework to detect cyber attacks compromising
global variables randomly, by using candidate invariants
in DCmGs [10]. Sahoo et al. introduced a cooperative
vulnerability factor framework to detect well-planned
balanced FDI attacks in DCmGs [11]. And the unknown
input observer (UIO), which can observe system states
regardless of unknown inputs, is widely adopted to de-
tect and identify malicious nodes/links in unreliable net-
works [12]. Recently, a novel UIO-based detector is pro-
posed to detect and identify specific cyber attacks in
the DCmG [13], where each DGU estimates neighbors’
states and requires only neighbors’ model parameters
and outputs.
However, most existing works assume that attackers
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have little knowledge of the system model (plant/control
/detection parameters). Actually, intelligent attackers
can learn critical system parameters after penetrating
into the system, and launch attacks at an appropriate
time coordinately, which can cause devastating damage
such as the Stuxnet [14]. Therefore, it is necessary to
investigate what attackers can do when they have some
model knowledge, which can provide novel design in-
sights to mitigate potential security threats in DCmGs.
In this paper, we make an effort to explore potential FDI
attacks under the UIO-based detector in the DCmG [13].
Compared to the previous work [1], we provide compre-
hensive characterizations of undetectable FDI attacks
and propose the corresponding countermeasure in the
DCmG, and main contributions are listed as follows:
First, we characterize zero trace undetectable (ZTU) and
nonzero trace undetectable (NTU) attacks under the
UIO-based detector. Then, by approximating primary
control loops as static unit gains [4], we theoretically
analyze attack impacts on current sharing and voltage
balancing in the DCmG. Finally, we propose the cor-
responding countermeasure against ZTU and NTU at-
tacks based on the average point of common coupling
(PCC) voltage deviation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the DCmG model and Section 3 shows the
problem formulation. Then, Section 4 characterizes un-
detectable attacks under the UIO-based detector and
attack impacts are analyzed in Section 5. And the cor-
responding countermeasure is proposed in Section 6. Fi-
nally, extensive simulations are presented in Section 7
and Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 DCmG Model
Notation : In this paper, |·| calculates the cardinality of
finite set and component-by-component absolute value
of a matrix/vector, ‖ · ‖ calculates the norm of a ma-
trix/vector, inequalities of matrices/vectors are com-
pared component-by-component, and y(∞) = lim
t→∞ y(t).
1n/1n×n and 0n/0n×n denote vectors/matrices with all
1 and 0 entries, respectively, and In denotes the unit
matrix with n × n dimension. Moreover, H1 denotes
the subspace of Rn composed by all vectors satisfying
〈v〉 = 1n
∑n
i=1 vi = 0, where 〈v〉 denotes the average of
all entries in vector v. Obviously, each vector in H1 has
n− 1 freedom 1 , indicating that the dimension of H1 is
n − 1, i.e., dim{H1} = n − 1. The orthogonal subspace
of H1 is represented by H1⊥, satisfying v = α1
n, α ∈
R,∀v ∈ H1⊥, and dim{H1⊥} = 1. And Rn can be decom-
posed as H1
⊕
H1⊥, where
⊕
calculates the direct sum
of subspaces.
2.1 Network Models
A weighted directed graph (digraph) is denoted by G =
{ν, ε,W }, where ν = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of nodes,
1 Any n− 1 entries in the vector can be set arbitrarily.
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Fig. 1. This figure shows the hierarchical control framework
of DGU i, where the secondary consensus layer and the pri-
mary control loop are emphasized in blue and gray shadows,
respectively, and the corresponding countermeasure is em-
phasized in orange shadow.
ε ⊆ ν × ν is the set of edges, and the diagonal ma-
trix W = diag{aij} ∈ R|ε|×|ε|. aij is the weight of
edge (i, j) ∈ ε and the set of neighbors of node i is
Ni = {j|(i, j) ∈ ε or (j, i) ∈ ε}. P (G) ∈ R|ν|×|ε| is the
incidence matrix of G, and the Laplacian matrix of G
is L(G) = P (G)WP (G)T, which is independent of the
orientations of edges.
Electrical and Communication Networks: The
electrical network of DCmG is represented by weighted
digraph Gel = {ν, εel,Wel}, where nodes are DGUs,
edges are power lines whose orientations define refer-
ence directions of positive currents, and edge weights
are conductances of power lines, i.e., 1/Rij . Moreover,
the set of neighbors of node i is N eli , |ν| = N andL(G) = M . The unencrypted (encrypted) communica-
tion network of DCmG is denoted by weighted graph
Gc = {ν, εc,Wc} (Gec = {ν, εec,Wec}), where the
weight acij = a
c
ji (a
ec
ij = a
ec
ji ), i.e., the communication is
bidirectional, and acij > 0 (a
ec
ij > 0) if edge (i, j) ∈ εc
((i, j) ∈ εec). The set of neighbors of node i is N ci
(N eci ), and L(Gc) = L (L(Gec) = Le).
Assumption 1: The weighted digraphs Gc and Gel are
both weakly connected 2 . Moreover, Gc and Gel have the
same topology, and L = M .
Assumption 2: The digraph Gec is weakly connected
and εc ⊆ εec.
Remark 1: Assumption 1 is established to guarantee
globally and exponentially stable control of the DCmG
according to [4], under which DGU i need know the resis-
tancesRij of all power lines connecting it to its electrical
neighbors j,∀j ∈ N eli . Given the quasi-stationary line
approximations of power line dynamics [3], Rij can be
estimated through Rij =
|Vj−Vi|
Iij
in steady-state, where
Iij is the current on power line (i, j), Vi and Iij are mea-
sured by DGU i locally, and Vj is transmitted from DGU
j to DGU i over Gec. Moreover, Assumption 2 gives some
basic properties of Gec to make the proposed counter-
measure effective.
2 A digraph is weakly connected if replacing all of its di-
rected edges with undirected edges produces a connected
graph.
2
2.2 Dynamics Model
According to Fig.1, each DGU contains a DC voltage
source, a buck converter, a local load current and a RLC
(resistor, inductor, and capacitor) filter. Vti is the out-
put voltage of DC buck converter, ILi is the load current,
and Vi and Iti are the PCC voltage and output current,
respectively. The hierarchical control framework is de-
ployed in each DGU, where the primary controller tracks
local reference voltage and the secondary consensus layer
regulates local reference voltage to achieve current shar-
ing and voltage balancing in the DCmG [4]. The dynam-
ics model of DGU i is
x˙i(t) =Aiixi(t) + biui(t) + giψi(t)+
+Midi + ξi(t) + ωi(t)
yi(t) =Cixi(t) + ρi(t)
, (1)
where xi(t) = [Vi(t), Iti(t), vi(t)]
T is the state vector,
vi(t) is the integral of voltage tracking error satisfying
v˙i(t) = Vref,i +ψi(t)− Vi(t), Vref,i is the nominal refer-
ence voltage of DGU i and ψi(t) is the secondary control
input. Besides, di = [ILi, Vref,i]
T is the constant exoge-
nous input vector, yi(t) ∈ R3 denotes the output vector
and Ci = I
3. The physical couplings with neighboring
DGUs are modeled as ξi(t) =
∑
j∈N el
i
Aijxj(t) ∈ R3,
and details of Aii,Aij ,Mi, gi, bi can be found in [3].
Moreover, we assume the process noise and measurement
noise satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 3: The process noise and measurement
noise are unknown-but-bounded (UBB) i.e., |ωi(t)| ≤
ω¯i ∈ R3, |ρi(t)| ≤ ρ¯i ∈ R3,∀t ≥ 0.
Remark 2: There exist several practical situations
where the noise is UBB. For example, the noise during
the audio design is a set of narrow-band signals with fre-
quency spectrum range from 20HZ to 20KHZ [15]. And
the bounds of system noise depend on the bounds of
parameter variation and sensor’s quantization error [16].
The primary control input is ui(t) = Vti = k
T
i yi(t),
where ki ∈ R3 depends only on local information [3].
The secondary control input is obtained through the fol-
lowing consensus scheme:
ψ˙i(t) = −[0, kI , 0]
∑
j∈Nci
acij(
yi(t)
Isti
− y
c
i,j(t)
Istj
), (2)
where yci,j(t) ∈ R3 is the output of DGU j transmitted
to DGU i over Gc, Isti > 0, Istj > 0 are corresponding
rated currents, and kI > 0 is an invariant parameter.
Without loss of generality, we assume the nominal ref-
erence voltages satisfy Assumption 4 as in [4]. And the
control objectives are formulated in Definitions 1-2.
Assumption 4: The nominal reference voltages are
equal among all DGUs, i.e., Vref,i = Vref ,∀i ∈ ν.
Definition 1 (Voltage Balancing): Under Assump-
tion 4, voltage balancing is achieved if 〈v(∞)〉 = Vref ,
where 〈v(∞)〉 is the steady-state average PCC voltage.
Definition 2 (Current Sharing): For constant load
currents, current sharing is achieved if Iti(∞)Is
ti
=
Itj(∞)
Is
tj
,
∀i, j ∈ ν, i.e., load currents are shared proportionally to
DGUs’ rated currents.
3 Problem Formulation
3.1 Attack Model
We consider the FDI attack injecting malicious signal
into the communication link, which is modeled as
yci,j(t) = yj(t) + τ(t− Ta)φi,j(t), (3)
where yci,j(t) is the corrupted data that DGU i receives
from DGU j through link (i, j) ∈ εc,φi,j(t) is the attack
vector and τ(t− Ta) is the step function with Ta delay.
Obviously, the attack is started at t = Ta, and y
c
i,j(t) =
yj(t), t ≤ Ta. Furthermore, the attacker can get some
static plant/control/detection parameters of each DGU
from the insider, but is hard to intrude into DGUs due
to various host-based defense mechanisms [17].
3.2 UIO-based Detector
A bank of UIO-based detectors is deployed in each DGU
to detect and identify the FDI attack (3) according to
[13]. First, we transform the dynamics model of DGU
j, j ∈ N ci to the typical UIO structure:{
x˙j(t) = Akjxj(t) + E¯j d¯j(t) + ωj(t) + bjkjρj(t)
yj(t) = Cjxj(t) + ρj(t)
, (4)
where Akj = Ajj + bjk
T
j ∈ R3×3, E¯j d¯j(t) = Mjdj +
gjψj(t) + ξj(t), d¯j(t) ∈ R2 denotes the input vector un-
known to DGU i, and E¯j ∈ R3×2 is a known parameter
related to the capacitor parameter Ctj as follows.
E¯j =
 1Ctj 0 0
0 0 1
T ,Hj =

1 0 0
h12 h22 h32
0 0 1

T
. (5)
Given Theorem 1 in [18] and Cj = I
3, we can construct
the full order UIO deployed in DGU i as{
z˙i,j(t) = Fjzi,j(t) + Kˆjy
c
i,j(t)
xˆi,j(t) = zi,j(t) +Hjy
c
i,j(t)
, (6)
under which the state estimation error decays ex-
ponentially to a certain range related to the system
noise regardless of the unknown input vector d¯j(t).
zi,j(t) ∈ R3 is the state vector of UIO (6), xˆi,j(t) is the
estimated state vector of DGU j, and UIO parameters
Fj , Kˆj ,Hj ∈ R3×3 satisfy{
Kˆj = K1 +K2,Tj = I
3 −Hj
TjE¯j = 0
3×2,Fj = TjAkj −K1,K2 = FjHj
, (7)
where K1,K2,Tj ∈ R3×3, Hj is defined in (5), and
h12, h22, h32 ∈ R. Note that K1 should be appropriately
chosen to make Fj stable, and (7) is determined once
Hj and K1 are given. Let i,j(t) = xj(t)− xˆi,j(t) and
ri,j(t) = i,j(t)+ρj(t) be the state estimation error and
detection residual of (6), respectively, in the absence of
attacks. And the analytical expression of ri,j(t) is
ri,j(t) = e
Fjt(σ2i,j(0) + σ3i,j(t)) + Tjρj(t),
3
where σ2i,j(0) = i,j(0) + Hjρj(0) and σ3i,j(t) =∫ t
0
e−Fjτ (Tjωj(τ) + (Tjbjkj − Kˆj)ρj(τ))dτ . The ini-
tial state estimation error i,j(0) can be bounded by the
bound of measurement noise as Cj = I
3, i.e., |i,j(0)| ≤
ρ¯j . Moreover, there always exist positive constants κ, µ
such that ||eFjt|| ≤ κe−µt as Fj is stable. Then, the up-
per bound of |ri,j(t)| is
r¯i,j(t) = κe
−µt(σ¯2i,j(0) + σ¯3i,j(t)) + |Tj|ρ¯j , (8)
where |σ2i,j(0)| ≤ σ¯2i,j(0) = (I3+|Hj|)ρ¯j , |σ3i,j(t)| ≤
σ¯3i,j(t) =
∫ t
0
|e−Fjτ |(|Tj|ω¯j + |Tjbjkj−Kˆj|ρ¯j)dτ . As
d¯j(t) contains the load current and physical couplings,
daily operations such as load switches and plugging-
in/out of DGUs will not affect ri,j(t). Therefore, once
|ri,j(t)| > r¯i,j(t), (9)
it is believed that yci,j(t) is corrupted by FDI attack (3).
And the false alarm and the missed alarm under the
UIO-based detector are formally defined as follows.
Definition 3: If (9) is triggered when there exists no
FDI attack (3), then it is called a False Alarm; If (9)
is not triggered when there exists FDI attack (3), then
it is called a Missed Alarm.
3.3 Problems of Interest
Although zero false alarm can be achieved under the
UIO-based detector (6) and the trigger condition (9),
zero missed alarm cannot be guaranteed simultaneously.
In other words, there exist some undetectable attacks.
First, we characterize the detection residual under FDI
attack (3) as r˜i,j(t) = ri,j(t) + r
a
i,j(t), where
rai,j(t) = e
Fj(t−Ta)Hjφi,j(Ta) + Tjφi,j(t)+
−
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)Kˆjφi,j(τ)dτ .
(10)
On the one hand, (9) can be immediately trigged once
|rai,j(t)| > 2r¯i,j(t) [13]. On the other hand, the FDI at-
tack (3) is undetectable under the UIO-based detector if
and only if |r˜i,j(t)| ≤ r¯i,j(t). Moreover, since Cj = I3,
there exists no invariant zero in (4) according to Defini-
tion 4.4.1 in [19], indicating the absence of zero dynam-
ics. Therefore, distinguished from the zero dynamics at-
tack in [20], we aim to further explore undetectable FDI
attacks under the characteristics of the UIO-based detec-
tor in this paper. According to zero/nonzero rai,j(t), we
divide undetectable FDI attacks under the UIO-based
detector into the following two forms.
Definition 4: The FDI attack (3) is Zero Trace Un-
detectable (ZTU) if
r˜i,j(t) = ri,j(t),φi,j(t) 6= 03. (11)
Definition 5: The FDI attack (3) is Nonzero Trace
Undetectable (NTU) if
r˜i,j(t) 6= ri,j(t), |r˜i,j(t)| ≤ r¯i,j(t),φi,j(t) 6= 03. (12)
We aim to solve three problems in this paper: (1) How to
characterize undetectable FDI attacks under the UIO-
based detector (ZTU and NTU attacks)? (P1).(2) How
will undetectable FDI attacks affect voltage balancing
and current sharing? (P2). How to counteract unde-
tectable FDI attacks in the DCmG? (P3).
4 Undetectable Attacks under the UIO-based
Detector
In this section, we characterize undetectable attacks un-
der the UIO-based detector (6) given the typical UIO
form (4). Obviously, the UIO-based detector cannot dis-
tinguish the malicious data mimicking dynamics of the
unknown input vector d¯j(t) in (4) from normal measure-
ment, and thus we have the following result.
Theorem 1: If and only if{
x˙aj (t) = Akjx
a
j (t) + E¯j d¯
a
ij(t)
φi,j(t) = x
a
j (t),x
a
j (Ta) = 0
3 , d¯
a
ij(t) 6= 02, (13)
for t ≥ Ta, where xaj (t) ∈ R3, then the attack (3) is ZTU.
Proof: (If)According to (4), the Laplace form of yci,j(t)
under (13) is
yci,j(s) = (sI
3 −Akj)−1(xj(0) + E¯j d˜j(s)+
+ωj(s) + bjkjρj(s)) + ρj(s),
(14)
where s is the Laplacian and d˜j(s) = d¯j(s) + d¯
a
ij(s).
Obviously, (14) is equivalent to the output of (4) where
the unknown input vector d¯j(t) is switched to d˜j(t) at
t = Ta. Since the detection residual ri,j(t) is invariant
regardless of unknown inputs, the attack (3) satisfying
(13) is ZTU.
(Only If)According to Definition 4, we get
rai,j(Ta) = 0
3, r˙ai,j(t) = 0
3,∀t ≥ Ta. (15)
Given rai,j(Ta) = 0
3 and (10), we get (Hj+Tj)φi,j(Ta) =
03. And Hj + Tj = I3 according to (7), indicating that
φi,j(Ta) = 03. After substituting φi,j(Ta) = 03 into
(10), we can transform r˙ai,j(t) = 0
3 into
Tjφ˙i,j(t) = (FjTj + Kˆj)φi,j(t). (16)
Moreover, as TjE¯j = 03×2 and rank(Tj) + rank(E¯j) =
3, the image of E¯j is consistent with the null space of Tj .
Meanwhile, according to (7), we have TjAkj = FjTj +
Kˆj . Therefore, the solution of (15) is equivalent to (13),
which completes the proof.
By extending ZTU attack (13) to nonzero initial state
case based on system noise in (4), we get the NTU attack.
Theorem 2: The FDI attack (3) is NTU if{
x˙aj (t) = Akjx
a
j (t) + E¯j d¯
a
ij(t)
φi,j(t) = x
a
j (t)
, (17)
for all t ≥ Ta, d¯aij(t) ∈ R2, and
φi,j(Ta) = x
a
j (Ta) = I˜
3eFjTa σ˜i,j(Ta), (18)
where nonzero σ˜i,j(Ta) ∈ R3 satisfies |e−FjTaφi,j(Ta)| ≤
σ¯2i,j(0) + σ¯3i,j(Ta), and I˜
3 is derived from the unit
matrix I3 with its (2, 2)th diagonal entry replaced by 0.
4
Proof: Combining (5), (7) and (18), we getTjφi,j(Ta) =
03, indicating that (17) and (18) are the solution of
Tjφi,j(t) =
∫ t
Ta
eFj(t−τ)Kˆjφi,j(τ)dτ . Moreover, it is
inferred from (7) that Hjφi,j(Ta) = φi,j(Ta). Then,
(10) can be transformed to rai,j(t) = e
Fj(t−Ta)φi,j(Ta).
Therefore, we get
r˜i,j(t) = e
Fjt(e−FjTaφi,j(Ta) + σ
2
i,j(0) + σ
3
i,j(t)) + Tjρj(t).
Since |σ2i,j(0)| ≤ σ¯2i,j(0) and |σ3i,j(Ta)| ≤ σ¯3i,j(Ta),
there always exists a nonzero σ˜i,j(Ta) satisfying
|e−FjTaφi,j(Ta)| ≤ σ¯2i,j(0) + σ¯3i,j(Ta) such that
|e−FjTaφi,j(Ta) + σ2i,j(0) + σ3i,j(Ta)| ≤ σ¯2i,j(0) +
σ¯3i,j(Ta). Moreover, |σ3i,j(t)− σ3i,j(Ta)| ≤ σ¯3i,j(t)−
σ¯3i,j(Ta), t ≥ Ta, and thus
|r˜i,j(t)| ≤ ¯˜ri,j(t) ≤ r¯i,j(t), t ≥ Ta, (19)
where ¯˜ri,j(t) = κe
−µt(|e−FjTaφi,j(Ta) + σ2i,j(0) +
σ3i,j(Ta)|+ |σ3i,j(t)−σ3i,j(Ta)|) + |Tj|ρ¯j denotes the
tighter threshold caused by φi,j(t) satisfying (17) and
(18). And thus FDI attack (3) under (17) and (18) is
NTU, which completes the proof.
Remark 3: In Theorems 1-2, we reveal that the funda-
mental limitation of the UIO-based detector (6) comes
from the unknown input vector d¯j(t), whose dynamics
can be exploited to construct ZTU and NTU attacks. On
the one hand, the UIO-based detector (6) can reduce re-
quired inputs to estimate it’s neighboring DGUs’ states.
On the other hand, the unknown inputs will increase the
threats of undetectable attacks. Therefore, unknown in-
puts of the UIO-based detector need be appropriately
chosen to balance the costs of transmitting additional in-
puts, e.g., more communication packets, and the threats
of undetectable attacks.
Remark 4: According to (13), the ZTU attack vec-
tor can be arbitrarily large as (Akj, E¯j) is controllable,
and the initial state of NTU attack vector φi,j(Ta) is
mainly constrained by eFjTaσ¯3i,j(Ta), which converges
to a nonzero constant as Ta grows.
5 Attack Impacts Analysis in the DCmG
In this section, we analyze impacts of NTU attacks (17)
in the DCmG, which contains impacts of ZTU attacks
(13). Although the NTU attack vector φi,j(t) can be ar-
bitrarily large with well designed d¯aij(t), d¯
a
ij(t) should
be bounded to make the corrupted measurement yci,j(t)
physically reachable given the maximal/minimal PCC
voltage and output current in each DGU. Therefore,
we consider the most common and practical case where
d¯aij(t) is a bounded constant, and constant d¯
a
ij(t) is sim-
plified as d¯aij . Then, the attack vector is
φi,j(t) = e
Akj(t−Ta)φ˜i,j(Ta)−A−1kj E¯j d¯aij , (20)
where φ˜i,j(Ta) = φi,j(Ta) + A
−1
kj E¯j d¯
a
ij ∈ R3. Under
NTU attacks, we simplify primary control loops as unit
gains according to [4], i.e.,
v˜(t) = vref + ψ˜(t), (21)
where v˜(t) = [V˜1(t), · · · , V˜N (t)]T is the PCC voltage
vector under attacks, vref = [Vref,1, · · · , Vref,N ]T is
the constant nominal reference PCC voltage vector, and
ψ˜(t) = [ψ˜1(t), ..., ψ˜N (t)]
T is the secondary control input
vector under attacks. Given (2) and (3), we have
˙˜ψ(t) = −L˜Di˜t(t) + Caijkφi,j(t)li, (22)
where L˜ = kIL,D = diag{ 1Ist1 , · · · ,
1
Is
tN
}, i˜t(t) =
[I˜t1(t), · · · , I˜tN (t)]T is the output current vector under
attacks, Caij =
kIa
c
ij
Is
tj
, k = [0, 1, 0], and li = 0˜Ni ∈ RN
is derived from 0N with its ith entry replaced by 1 to
denote the targeted DGU i. According to the Kirchhoff
current law, the output current vector is decomposed as
i˜t(t) = Mv˜(t) + il, where il = [IL1, · · · , ILN ]T is the
constant load current vector. Therefore, combining (21)
with (22), we get
˙˜ψ(t) = −Qψ˜(t)− L˜Dil −Qvref + Caijkφi,j(t)li, (23)
where Q = L˜DM . Similar to the detection residual,
ψ˜(t) is decomposed as ψ˜(t) = ψ(t)+ψa(t), whereψa(t)
denotes the attack impacts on ψ(t).
Theorem 3: Under single NTU attack (20), we get
〈ψa(∞)〉 = C
a
ij
N
kA−1kj ((t− Ta)E¯j d¯aij − φ˜i,j(Ta)). (24)
Note that 〈ψa(t)〉 will not converge with nonzero d¯aij ,
under which neither voltage balancing nor current shar-
ing can be achieved in the DCmG.
Proof: The Proof is given in Appendix A of [21].
Moreover, we consider the case where NTU attack vec-
tors (20) are injected into multi-links ε˜a ⊆ εc coopera-
tively, under which 〈ψa(t)〉 will finally converge.
Theorem 4: Under cooperative NTU attacks (20) sat-
isfying ∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a
Caijkφi,j(∞) = 0, (25)
we get 〈ψa(∞)〉 = −
∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a
Caij
N kA
−1
kj φ˜i,j(Ta),
and current sharing is not achieved if and only if∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a C
a
ijkφi,j(∞)li 6= 0N .
Proof: The Proof is given in Appendix B of [21].
Remark 5: Once the attacker compromises one link
(i, j) ∈ εc, any NTU attack with nonzero d¯aij can desta-
bilize the DCmG. Moreover, if the attacker compromises
multi-links ε˜a cooperatively, then the average PCC volt-
age can be manipulated with cooperative NTU attacks
(20) satisfying (25), which can cause precise attack im-
pacts (e.g., economic losses) to the DCmG.
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6 Corresponding Countermeasure
In this section, we propose the countermeasure against
NTU and ZTU attacks based on the encrypted commu-
nication network Gec, through which the confidentiality
and integrity of transmission data can be assured [22].
The countermeasure is composed of the attack detection
phase and the impact counteraction phase.
6.1 Attack Detection Phase
We consider ZTU and NTU attacks causing steady-state
average PCC voltage deviation in this paper, which can
be observed through the proportional-integral average
dynamics consensus (PIADC) based estimator deployed
in each DGU. Then, the detection indicator di(t) is de-
rived from the estimated average PCC voltage deviation,
and a certain detection threshold is chosen to tolerate
the fluctuations caused by daily operations, e.g., load
switches and plugging-in/out of DGUs.
6.1.1 PIADC-based Estimator
The PIADC-based estimator in DGU i is
v¯i(s) = h(s)u1(s), ζi(s) = g(s)u2(s), (26)
where h(s) = γs+γ , g(s) =
γ
s , u1(t) = V˜i(t)−KP
∑
j∈N ec
i
aecij (v¯i(t)− v¯j(t))−KI
∑
j∈N ec
i
aecij (ζi(t)−ζj(t)), u2(t) =
KI
∑
j∈N ec
i
aecij (v¯i(t) − v¯j(t)). Note that v¯i(t), ζi(t) ∈ R
are transmitted over Gec, v¯i(t) is the estimated average
PCC voltage, and γ,KP ,KI are positive gains invariant
in all DGUs. Given Theorems 1-2 in [23] and Assumption
2, v¯i(t) can track constant and ramp average PCC volt-
ages 〈v˜(t)〉 regardless of initial states v¯i(0), ζi(0) with
certain γ,KP ,KI , a
ec
ij . Therefore, under single and co-
operative NTU attacks (20), we always have
v¯(∞) = 〈v˜(∞)〉1N , (27)
where v¯(∞) = [v¯1(∞), · · · , v¯N (∞)]T. Moreover, as en-
cryption and decryption processes are time-consuming
due to the limited computation capability of each DGU,
we aim to encrypt/decrypt only the PIADC-related data
to balance the trade off between security and control
performance of the DCmG.
6.1.2 Sliding Time Window (STW) based Detector
The estimated average PCC voltage deviation is
verri (t) = Vref − v¯i(t). (28)
Although daily operations never cause nonzero verri (∞)
in the DCmG, non-trivial instantaneous value of verri (t)
will emerge as it takes some time for v¯i(t) to converge
as Fig.3 shows. And it is difficult to distinguish attacks
from daily operations based only on verri (t), which means
daily operations may cause non-neglectable false alarms.
To solve the problem, we first flatten the fluctuations
caused by daily operations based on sliding time window
technology and yield the detection indicator di(t):
di(t) =
∫ t
t−T
|verri (τ)|dτ, t ≥ ts + T, (29)
where T is the fixed length of sliding time window, t = ts
is the activation time, and di(t) calculates the integral
of the sliding time window over |verri (t)|. And the gen-
eration algorithm of di(t) is given in Appendix F of [21].
Then, a detection threshold is chosen to tolerate cer-
tain daily operations, and the trigger condition of attack
alarm is
di(t) > T∆v, (30)
where ∆v > 0 denotes the least steady-state average
PCC voltage deviation that can be detected after tol-
erating daily operations. Obviously, ∆v need cover the
maximal average of the integral of the sliding time win-
dow over |verri (t)| caused by daily operations, which can
be far smaller than the maximum of |verri (t)| if T is
big enough, and thus di(t) can decrease the number of
missed alarms caused by tolerating daily operations.
6.2 Impact Counteraction Phase
Once (30) is triggered at t = T almi , the estimated average
PCC voltage deviation is fed into a proportional-integral
(PI) based compensator, i.e.,
Ci(t) = kcpv
err
i (t) + kci
∫ t
Talmi
verri (τ)dτ,∀i ∈ ν, (31)
where kcp and kci are positive gains, and the compensa-
tion value Ci(t) is added to the secondary control input
ψ˜i(t). Therefore, (21) is rewritten as 〈v˜(t)〉 = Vref +
〈ψa(t)〉 + 〈C(t)〉, where C(t) = [C1(t), · · · , CN (t)]T.
Given (27) and (28), we get verri (∞) = −〈ψa(∞)〉 −〈C(∞)〉. If 〈ψa(∞)〉 is a constant, then the equilibrium
of (31) is achieved with |verri (∞)| = 0, i.e., voltage bal-
ancing is reestablished. If 〈ψa(∞)〉 is a ramp signal, then
the equilibrium of (31) is achieved with nonzero con-
stant |verri (∞)|, indicating that voltage balancing can-
not be reestablished. Therefore, we aim to identify and
cut off threating communication links (i, j) ∈ εc with
nonzero d¯aij . Under Assumption 2, all output currents
Itj(t),∀j ∈ N ci are retransmitted from DGU j to i over
Gec to verify the integrity of kyci,j(t) after (31) has been
activated for Tc long, i.e.,
|Itj(t)− kyci,j(t− τec)| > ∆I , t ≥ T almi + Tc, (32)
where τec approximates the time delay caused by en-
cryption and decryption processes and ∆I > 0 is a pre-
defined threshold to tolerate the exponentially decay-
ing attack vector 3 . Once (32) is triggered, threating
communication links and corresponding power lines are
cut off simultaneously to guarantee the establishment of
L = M . If Gc and Gel are still connected after cutting
off all threating communication links and PCC voltage
capacities are enough, then current sharing and volt-
age balancing can be both reestablished. Furthermore,
counteraction actions (31) and (32) are terminated once
di(T
comp
i ) ≤ Tδ, T compi > T almi , where δ is a predefined
threshold to tolerate the oscillating noise in V˜i(t), and
Ci(T
comp
i ) is added to the secondary control input as a
constant.
3 According to (20), φi,j(t) decays exponentially to zero if
d¯aij = 0
2.
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Remark 6: Although the countermeasure is designed
given the constant d¯aij , we believe that it still works
when d¯aij(t) is not constant. We discuss two cases as
follows: a) if d¯aij(t) decays exponentially to zero, then
φi,j(t) will also decay exponentially to zero according
to (17), under which current sharing can be achieved
while voltage balancing is not achieved with constant
average PCC voltage deviation. The attack impacts can
be totally counteracted by (31) without triggering (32).
b) if d¯aij(t) is a sine/cosine signal, then φi,j(t) will also
vary as d¯aij(t), under which neither current sharing nor
voltage balancing can be achieved. Moreover, 〈v¯(t)〉 can
only track 〈v˜(t)〉1N with certain tracking error as 〈v˜(t)〉
varies quickly, and the attack impacts can be counter-
acted only after all threating communication links with
nonzero d¯aij(t) are identified and cut off through (32).
7 Simulations
In simulations, we establish a DCmG composed of 8
DGUs in Matlab Simulink/PLECS, and corresponding
parameters can be found in Appendix C of [21]. The
nominal reference voltage is Vref = 48V, and the bounds
of noise are ρ¯i = ω¯i = [0.001, 0.003, 0]
T ,∀i ∈ ν =
{1, · · · , 8}. The simulations are composed of 3 stages.
Stage 1 (Initialization of DCmG): At t = 0s, all
primary controllers are activated; At t = 2s, all DGUs
except DGU 7 are connected through power lines. At
t = 4s, Gc and Gec are established, and UIO-based de-
tectors, PIADC-based estimators and SWT-based de-
tectors are all activated. The topology of Gec coincides
with the topology of Gc, and aecij = 1,∀(i, j) ∈ εec. More-
over, edge weights of Gc are set as Assumption 1, and
kI = 5. UIO parameters are given in Appendix E of [21].
Constant time delays τc = 5ms and τc + τec = 15ms are
added into Gc and Gec, respectively, to simulate transmis-
sion, encryption and decryption processes, and we have
further investigated the time delay margin of (26) un-
der different PIADC parameters as shown in Appendix
D of [21]. Parameters of PIADC-based estimators are
γ = 90,KP = 3.34 andKI = 8, and parameters of STW-
based detector are T = 1.3s,∆v = 0.4V, δ = 0.005V.
Parameters of impact counteraction actions (31),(32) are
kcp = 1, kci = 20, Tc = 1s,∆I = 0.1A.
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Fig. 2. This figure shows Evolutions of the DCmG, where
solid black lines are power lines between DGUs and dotted
blue lines denote communication links εc.
Stage 2 (Daily operations):At t = 8s, DGU 8 is dis-
connected from the DCmG. At t = 12s, all load cur-
rents are decreased by 10% of their rated values. At
t = 16s, DGUs 7 and 8 are plugged into the DCmG si-
multaneously. According to Fig. 3, three daily operations
will not destroy voltage balancing or current sharing in
the DCmG, but they indeed cause some fluctuations on
verri (t), and max4≤t≤20,i∈ν |verri (t)| = 4.7V. While the
fluctuations on di(t) can be tolerated by T∆v with the
cost of missed alarms for steady-state average PCC volt-
age deviation less than ∆v = 0.4V < 4.7V, indicating
that di(t) can effectively decrease the number of missed
alarms caused by tolerating daily operations.
Stage 3 (ZTU/NTU attacks):At t = Ta1 = 20s,
NTU attacks 1 targeting at communication links
(7, 6) and (5, 7) are launched, and attack vectors re-
lated parameters are d¯a76 = d¯
a
57 = 0
2,φ7,6(Ta1) =
−0.0172 ∗ [1, 0, 1]T,φ5,7(Ta1) = −0.0337 ∗ [1, 0, 1]T. At
t = Ta2 = 25s, ZTU attack 2 targeting at communica-
tion link (8, 3) is launched, and the attack vector related
parameters are d¯a83 = [−5, 0]T,φ8,3(Ta2) = 03. At
t = Ta3 = 38s, NTU attacks 3 targeting at communica-
tion links (7, 6) and (5, 7) are launched, and attack vec-
tors related parameters are d¯a76 = [0,−0.8333]T, d¯a57 =
[−10, 0]T,φ7,6(Ta3) = −0.0175 ∗ [1, 0, 1]T,φ5,7(Ta3) =
−0.0343 ∗ [1, 0, 1]T. Note that all initial states of
NTU attacks satisfy (18), and NTU attacks 3 satisfy∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a C
a
ijkφi,j(∞) = 0. As shown in Fig.4, no at-
tack alarm is triggered by UIO-based detectors. And
according to Fig.3, the impacts of NTU attacks 1 are
totally counteracted by PI-based compensators (31),
and voltage balancing is reestablished after t = 22.47s.
ZTU attack 2 is detected by DGU 8 at T alm8a2 = 26.42s,
and voltage balancing and current sharing are reestab-
lished after t = 36.69s. NTU attacks 3 are detected by
DGU 7 and DGU 5 at T alm7a3 = 38.70s, T
alm
5a3 = 38.76s,
respectively, and voltage balancing and current sharing
are reestablished after t = 45.5s. Moreover, (32) is not
triggered by NTU attacks 1 as both attack vectors decay
exponentially to zero, and is triggered by ZTU attack 2
and NTU attacks 3 because of their nonzero d¯aij .
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we revealed that the fundamental limita-
tion of UIO-based detector lies in the unknown inputs,
which can expose the DCmG to threats of ZTU and
NTU attacks. And it is proved that single NTU attack
and cooperative NTU attacks can easily destroy current
sharing and voltage balancing in the DCmG. Moreover,
the proposed countermeasure can detect ZTU and NTU
attacks and counteract the attack impacts effectively.
However, there exist several limitations for the proposed
countermeasure. First, cooperative NTU attacks can de-
stroy current sharing with small average PCC voltage de-
viation, which means that the proposed countermeasure
may not detect and counteract these attacks. Second,
the impact counteraction phase requires to cut off all
threating communication links with nonzero attack vec-
tors, which will degrade control performances a lot and
even disconnect communication networks. Therefore, it
is necessary to detect ZTU and NTU attacks based on
the average PCC voltage deviation and quantitative at-
tack impacts on current sharing, simultaneously, and at-
tack impacts may be counteracted by estimating attack
7
Fig. 3. This figure shows the evolution of PCC voltages
Vi(t)/V, output currents in per-unit
Iti(t)
Isti
/p.u., estimated
average PCC voltage deviations verri (t)/V, detection indica-
tors di(t) and the true average PCC voltage Vav(t)/V under
daily operations and attacks. Red dotted lines in |verri (t)| and
di(t) denote max4≤t≤20,i∈ν |verri (t)| and T∆v, respectively.
Fig. 4. This figure shows the evolution of detection residuals
|r8,3(t)|, |r7,6(t)| and |r5,7(t)|, t ≥ 16s, where solid lines rep-
resent actual detection residuals, dotted lines represent the
bounds of detection residuals, and |ri,j(t)|a is the ath entry.
vectors through the encrypted communication network,
which are left as our future works.
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A Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: According to Proposition 3 in [4], we have a)
ker(Q)=H1⊥, range(Q)= H
1; b) Q is diagonalizable and
has non-negative eigenvalues, and its algebraic multi-
plicity of zero eigenvalue is one. Therefore, the eigen-
value eigenvector pairs of Q can be denoted by pi =
(λi, qi), i ∈ ν, where λ1 = 0, 0 < λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λN ,
qi ∈ RN , q1 ∈ H1⊥, and {q2, ..., qN} constitutes a basis
of H1. Thus, in the absence of (20), we have
ψ(t) = e−Qtψ(0) +
N∑
i=2
αi
λi
(1− e−λit)qi, (A.1)
where αi ∈ R and
∑N
i=2 αiqi = −L˜Dil −Qvref ∈ H1.
If ψ(0) ∈ H1, then 〈ψ(∞)〉 = 0 and voltage balancing
and current sharing can be achieved at exponential con-
vergence rate λ2. And we let ψa(t) = ψa1(t) + ψa2(t),
where ψa1(t) and ψa2(t) represent the attack impacts
caused by eAkj(t−Ta)φ˜i,j(Ta) and −A−1kj E¯j d¯aj , respec-
tively. As A−1kj E¯j d¯
a
j is a constant vector, ψa2(t) can be
directly obtained as
ψa2(t) = α1l(t− Ta)q1 +
N∑
i=2
αil
λi
(1− e−λi(t−Ta))qi, (A.2)
where αil ∈ R and
∑N
i=1 αilqi = −CaijkA−1kj E¯j d¯aj li. If
Akj is diagonalizable
4 , then we get eAkj(t−Ta)φ˜i,j(Ta) =∑3
m=1 ηme
βm(t−Ta)am, where (βm,am),∀m ∈ ν =
{1, 2, 3} are the eigenvalue eigenvector pairs of Akj ,
ηm ∈ R, am ∈ R3 and
∑3
m=1 ηmam = φ˜i,j(Ta). Thus,
ψa1(t) =
3∑
m=1
C˜aije
−βmTae−Qt
∫ t
Ta
eβmτeQτ lidτ, (A.3)
where C˜aij = C
a
ijηmam2 ∈ R and am2 = kam ∈ R.
As {q1, q2, ..., qN} constitutes a basis of RN , li can be
decomposed as li =
∑N
r=1 δrqr, where δ1q1 = 〈li〉1N =
1
N 1
N , and thus eQtli =
∑N
r=1 δre
λrtqr. If βm + λr 6=
4 When Akj is not diagonalizable, the stability and conver-
gence properties can be analyzed in a similar way, under
which system states can still converge to a stable value but
not at an exponential speed.
0,∀m ∈ ν, r ∈ ν, 5 then the integral part in (A.3) can
be computed as∫ t
Ta
eβmτeQτ lidτ =
N∑
r=1
δr
βm + λr
(e(βm+λr)t − e(βm+λr)Ta)qr.
(A.4)
Substituting (A.4) into (A.3), we get
ψa1(t) =
3∑
m=1
N∑
r=1
Caηmam2δr
βm + λr
(eβm(t−Ta) − e−λr(t−Ta))qr.
Given (A.2) and α1lq1 =
kIaij
NIs
tj
kA−1kj E¯j d¯
a
ij1
N , we have
〈ψa2(∞)〉 = kIaij
NIstj
kA−1kj E¯j d¯
a
ij(t− Ta). (A.5)
Since Akj is stable, Re(βm) < 0,∀m ∈ ν. And given
the expression of ψa1(t) and δ1q1 =
1
N 1
N , we get
〈ψa1(∞)〉 = −
3∑
m=1
Caηmam2
Nβm
. (A.6)
Moreover, as ( 1βm ,am),∀m ∈ ν are the eigenvalue eigen-
vector pairs of A−1kj , we have
eA
−1
kj
(t−Ta)φ˜i,j(Ta) =
3∑
m=1
ηme
1
βm
(t−Ta)am. (A.7)
After differentiating (A.7) and letting t = Ta, we obtain
A−1kj φ˜i,j(Ta) =
3∑
m=1
ηm
βm
am. (A.8)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.6), we get
〈ψa1(∞)〉 = −kIaij
NIstj
kA−1kj φ˜i,j(Ta). (A.9)
Adding (A.5) and (A.9), we can get the total attack
impacts
〈ψa(∞)〉 = kIaij
NIstj
kA−1kj ((t− Ta)E¯j d¯aij − φ˜i,j(Ta)).
Under nonzero d¯aij , 〈ψa(t)〉 diverges with t, and
thus 〈ψ˜(t)〉 also diverges with t given 〈ψ˜(t)〉 =
〈ψ(t)〉 + 〈ψa(t)〉, where 〈ψ(t)〉 decays exponentially to
zero. Thus, 〈v˜(t)〉 also diverges with t according to (21),
i.e., voltage balancing is not achieved. Moreover, given
(A.2), each entry in ψa2(t) diverges with t, indicat-
ing that all PCC voltages, including the DGUs whose
communication links are not attacked, cannot converge.
Therefore, we can conclude that current sharing is not
achieved either, which completes the proof.
5 When βm = −λr, the integral part in (A.4) will be differ-
ent, and the system can still achieve convergence but not at
an exponential speed.
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B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: According to (20), φi,j(∞) = −A−1kj E¯j d¯aj , in-
dicating that ∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a
CaijkA
−1
kj E¯j d¯
a
j = 0. (B.1)
Given the linear dynamics of (23), the impacts caused
by compromising multi-links are the sum of impacts that
would have been caused by compromising each link in-
dividually. Then, substituting (B.1) into (24), we get
〈ψa(∞)〉 = −
∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a
Caij
N
kA−1kj φ˜i,j(Ta). (B.2)
Current Sharing: According to (22), when ψ˜(t) achieves
the equilibrium, we have
L˜Di˜t(∞) =
∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a
Caijkφi,j(∞)li. (B.3)
Given (B.1), we obtain 〈∑(i,j)∈ε˜a Caijkφi,j(∞)li〉 = 0N ,
indicating that (B.3) is solvable. And the solu-
tion Di˜t(∞) /∈ H1⊥, which means current shar-
ing is not achieved in the DCmG, if and only if∑
(i,j)∈ε˜a C
a
ijkφi,j(∞)li 6= 0N . Therefore, the proof is
completed.
C Parameters of DGUs
Table C.1
Electrical Parameters of DGUs
Converter parameters
DGU Rt(Ω) Lt(mH)Ct(mF ) DGU Rt(Ω) Lt(mH)Ct(mF )
DGU1 0.2 1.8 2.2 DGU2 0.4 2.0 1.7
DGU3 0.3 2.2 1.9 DGU4 0.6 2.5 2.4
DGU5 0.5 3.0 2.7 DGU6 0.4 1.6 3.0
DGU7 0.2 1.4 2.1 DGU8 0.4 1.2 1.6
Power line parameters
(i, j) Rij(Ω)(i, j) Rij(Ω) (i, j) Rij(Ω)(i, j) Rij(Ω)
(1,2) 0.05 (1,6) 0.10 (2,3) 0.07 (3,4) 0.09
(3,8) 0.12 (4,5) 0.14 (4,8) 0.20 (5,6) 0.25
(5,7) 0.06 (6,7) 0.10 (1,7) 0.15 (8,7) 0.17
D Time Delay Margin
Remark 7: Furthermore, we have investigated the rela-
tionships between the time delay margin of the PIADC-
based estimator and the PIADC parameters γ,KP ,KI
Table C.2
Load Currents of DGUs
Converter parameters
DGU ILi(A) L
s
ti(A) DGU ILi(A) L
s
ti(A)
DGU1 10 20 DGU2 10 20
DGU3 15.75 30 DGU4 9 20
DGU5 14 20 DGU6 21 30
DGU7 16.25 25 DGU8 18.75 25
and the maximal eigenvalue of Le, i.e., λ
e
N . As shown in
Tables D.1-D.2, smaller PIADC parameters have larger
time delay time margin and larger λeN causes smaller
time delay margin, which matches the result of Theo-
rem 10 in [24]. According to Theorem 3.20 in [25], the
lower bound of λeN is positively related to the num-
ber of edges if |εec| < N(N−1)4 . Therefore, higher edge-
connectivity of Gec 6 causes smaller time delay margin
if |εec| < N(N−1)4 . Moreover, λeN is positively related to
the edge weights, and thus larger edge weights lead to
smaller time delay margin.
Table D.1
Time delay margin under different PIADC parameters, λeN =
5.5616.
Margin(ms)
γ,KP ,KI 75, 4, 6.5 85, 6, 8 95, 8, 10 100, 10, 14
Time delay margin 55 35 15 5
Table D.2
Time delay margin under different λeN , γ = 95,KP =
8,KI = 10.
Margin(ms)
λeN 5.4903 .5616 6
Time delay margin 16 15 10.5
E UIO Parameters
F3 = F6 = F7 =

−1 0 0
0 −1 0
0 0 −1
 ,H3 =

1 −0.05 0
0 0.95 0
0 −0.05 1
 .
H6 =

1 −0.02 0
0 0.98 0
0 −0.02 1
 ,H7 =

1 −0.04 0
0 0.96 0
0 −0.04 1
 .
6 The minimum number of edges whose removal renders Gec
disconnected.
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F Generation algorithm of di(t)
Algorithm 1 shows the detailed generation process of
di(t), and di(t) is updated every sampling period ∆t.
First, all |verri (t)|,∀t ∈ ST are recorded into vr ∈ RNT−1
through steps 2-4. The sum of all entries in vr is calcu-
lated as Sum at step 5. Then, for each v
err
i (t), t ≥ ts+T ,
real-time di(t) is calculated at step 8, and Sum,vr are
updated for the next circle through steps 7 and 9-13.
Algorithm 1 Generation of detection indicator di(t)
Input: Average PCC voltage deviation, verri (t), t ≥ ts;
Sampling period, ∆t; Length of the sliding window,
T = NT∆t, NT ≥ 1; Record vector, vr = 0NT−1.
Output: The detection indicator, di(t), t ≥ ts,∀i ∈ ν;
1: di(ts) = 0;
2: for each t ∈ ST = {ts + ∆t, ..., ts + (NT − 1)∆t} do
3: vr((t− ts)/∆t) = |verri (t)|, di(t) = 0;
4: end for
5: Calculate Sum =
∑NT−1
k=1 vr(k);
6: for each t ≥ ts + T do
7: Sum = Sum + |verri (t)|;
8: di(t) = ∆tSum;
9: Sum = Sum − vr(1);
10: for k = 1; k < NT − 1; k = k + 1; do
11: vr(k) = vr(k + 1);
12: end for
13: vr(NT − 1) = |verri (t)|;
14: end for
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